America After Trump

What if there’s no way back?

In the heads of millions of Americans opposed to Trump, there’s a hopeful scenario: his collapsing poll numbers lead to a Republican wipeout in the midterms, followed by a 2028 landslide so overwhelming that none of his maneuvering could keep him in power.

But even if that happens — then what? How long would it take to return to something like normal, at home and abroad?

One expert says: probably never. Because the damage — especially to international relationships — may be irreparable.

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In the minds of our former allies, the lesson is simple: America is always one election away from chaos. One election away from a president, surrounded by yes-men, willing to threaten allies, start irrational conflicts, and tear up trade agreements.

In a piece on Salon, well worth your taking the time to read, political analyst Mike Lofgren argues that Trump has pushed the United States to a point where there is “no going back to the status quo ante” of previous administrations.

He points to actions and rhetoric involving Venezuela and Iran, talk of taking Greenland, making Canada a state, and demanding veto power over allied governments and policies. All of it has strained relationships that took decades to build.

An empty chair at G7

Lofgren’s conclusion is blunt: this may be a point of no return — one that any future president, from either party, would struggle to navigate.

He writes:

Yet another future president might have retraced a path toward more balanced economic or security policies once the disadvantages of trade wars or diplomatic and military isolation became obvious.

But Trump, in large part through his feral nastiness and adolescent vulgarity, has made that sort of reversal all but impossible. A hypothetical president might have distanced himself from NATO, but it’s inconceivable that he would covet an alliance partner’s territory to the point where that government made plans to blow up the airfields in the coveted territory in case of invasion.

Lofgren also argues that long-standing treaties and alliances were already eroding — Trump simply accelerated that process.

He goes further:

Trump hates reading, as his spotty education and lack of general knowledge testify. That reflects his profound lack of intellectual curiosity.

He attempts to disguise this deficiency with endless boasting about himself and endless denigration of others. He is obsessed with popular media and showbiz and the shabby values they embody.

It is almost certain, to this observer anyway, that after the last hanging chad in Florida, after the rubble of the World Trade Center had cooled, after the first improvised roadside bomb exploded in Iraq, and after Lehman Brothers collapsed, Trump, or someone like him, was inevitable.

I find Lofgren’s analysis disturbing. Disheartening. Depressing.

But I can’t say he’s wrong.

And then there’s the damage at home. The pressure on the media. The reshaping of federal agencies. The loss of experienced government personnel in critical roles. The slow hollowing out of institutions that depend on expertise and continuity.

If there is a way back, it would require a fundamental rethinking of America’s role in the world. Possibly even stepping away from the idea of being the “leader of the free world” — a role we’ve already been retreating from.

It would mean humility.

And I don’t see that happening. Not at a national level. Not in any sustained way. It’s just not in our psyche.

The alternative is to double down — on strength, pressure, dominance. But that path comes with a cost. A heavy one. It would take even more money. More pressure. More strain on the system. Much like what happened in Russia. The Soviet Union didn’t collapse overnight. It strained under its own weight until it finally gave way.

In 1998, Russian analyst Igor Panarin predicted that the United States would fracture into multiple regions, driven by economic, social, and moral decline. He even outlined who might control what, with China playing a direct role.

He was wrong about the timeline. But the idea itself — the possibility of fragmentation — doesn’t feel as far-fetched as it once did.

It may be that the future of the United States is not a clean restoration of its past, but something more uncertain. More unstable. Less unified.

I desperately hope I’m wrong.

What do you think? Is there a way back? Let me know in the comments. And if this piece resonates, share it. It helps grow the reach of Archer’s Line.

And check out the Disciples of Democracy podcast with my friend Jack Messenger.